This paper provides a contemporary examination of policy making and participatory practice in the context of devolving governance in the UK. The paper takes Northern Ireland as its focus and is particularly timely considering the context of devolved governance, the ongoing transition from conflict to relative peace and the potential for rejuvenating democracy through participatory governance. The paper concentrates on one particular policy process, namely the attempted designation of a national park in the Mournes Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). A thematic analysis of qualitative data is drawn upon to analyse the structural factors that framed the policy making process and the role of power in determining how consultation processes were initiated, designed and undertaken. Using Lukes' model (1974; as an analytical framework, power is shown to manifest at multiple levels within the policy making process to influence policy outcomes. The paper reveals how the persistence of a top-down approach to policy development combined with a highly parochial political outlook undermined attempts to designate a Mourne National Park.
Introduction
National parks were designated in England and Wales throughout the second half of the twentieth century (under the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act).
Despite recommendations since 1947, no national parks were designated in Scotland or Northern Ireland during this period due primarily to landowner opposition and political circumstances (Shoard, 1987; Bell and Stockdale, 2015a) . The prospect of national park designation gained renewed impetus in both regions following political devolution in 1999 when the then UK government devolved specific powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Changes in the fields of environmental and political governance provide the context within which a new national parks agenda emerged. The notion that the process of governing society has undergone a conceptual shift from government to governance has been widely debated (Edwards, 2001; Goodwin, 2008; Lockwood, 2010; Davies, 2011; Stoker, 2011; Hall, 2011; Eagles et al., 2013) . In the UK, New Labour (1997) embraced a governance agenda as the drive for more participative modes of governing gained momentum over the course of the 1990s (Healey, 2006) . Decentralisation, through political devolution (1998) (1999) for the UK regions, provided an opportunity to engrain participatory processes in governing practice and enable more locally tailored policy development.
National park designation emerged as one of the first policy agendas in the newly devolved regions of Scotland and Northern Ireland (Rettie, 2001; MNPWP, 2007) . Even prior to devolution (1999), Donald Dewar, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, declared his wish to designate Scottish national parks (The Scottish Office, 1997) . A preliminary national parks consultation across Scotland (February 1998) informed detailed national park proposals (SNH, 1999) . In the first few months of the newly devolved Scottish Parliament a National Park Bill was consulted upon and debated before being passed as the National Parks (Scotland) Act 2000 (Rettie, 2001) . Site specific consultation was later employed to inform the designation of two national parks in Loch Lomond and the Trossachs (2003) Building on previous academic critiques of the Mournes policy process (Bell and Stockdale, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c ) the emphasis here is on an additional aspect; namely, the influence of wider structuring forces on participatory governance, in particular the role of power in framing how consultation processes were initiated, designed and undertaken. These structural factors provide the vehicle for examining power in this paper and are explored under three overarching themes: initiating national parks policy, governance structures and setting of the agenda and the consultation process and government's response. The findings help to shed light on the likely success of Northern Ireland's recent reform of public administration which devolved planning powers to new local councils (Knox, 2006) .
The remainder of the paper is set out in five parts. In the first part, the governing context within which the new national parks agenda (post 1997) emerged in the UK is discussed. In the second part, literature relating to public participation and partnerships is reviewed and a framework for analysing power outlined. Part three provides the context for the Mournes case study and explains the methodology adopted (a qualitative case study approach). The fourth part empirically examines the three themes listed above. In the final part, the key findings are reviewed and wider inferences are drawn about politics, power and decision making in the context of a devolving UK, specifically with regard to the most recent reform of public administration in Northern Ireland and prospects for the future management of Northern Ireland's significant landscapes.
Evolving Forms of Governing in the UK
The traditional 'Westminster model' of Government and politics in the UK transmits legislative authority from the Crown through the UK Parliament, incorporating parliamentary sovereignty, accountability through elections and strong cabinet government (Rhodes, 1997) .
Therefore, 'government' implies national level processes and top-down managerial processes (Stoker, 1998) . The term 'governance' emerged during the 1980s to describe how local government authority was being compromised by the involvement of non-state actors in governing processes (Rhodes, 1996; Jessop, 1997; Stoker, 1998) . In the absence of a commonly agreed definition, governance is aptly referred to by Rhodes (1996: 652-653) , as a term to describe the 'new process of governing…or the new method by which society is governed'. Governance is often associated with the involvement of non-state actors in the process of governing which is realised through partnerships and public participation (Eagles, 2013; Griffin, 2012; Cornwall, 2002; Stoker, 1998) . The governance agenda came to prominence with the election of New Labour (1997) who promised democratic renewal through constitutional change and more participative forms of governing.
Political devolution to the UK regions (1998) (1999) potentially signalled the beginning of a new political culture aimed at a more inclusive, locally responsive, proximate and accountable form of politics (Mitchell, 2000; Adams and Robinson, 2002 Fundamental to the notion of a shift from 'government to governance' is understanding how dominant a position the state adopts within the political process (Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000) .
While 'governance tends to be associated with more informal, decentralised and pluralistic decision making structures' (Griffin, 2012: 210) , Davies (2011: 60) detected little evidence of governments devolving substantial power to governance networks. Marsh et al. (2003: 332) caution:
'Politics may be characterised by plurality' but it does not necessarily 'reflect a pluralist power structure' (cited in Griffin, 2012: 215) .
Participation and inclusion can confuse who has authority as decision making can become further removed from elected political structures (Skelcher, 2000; Gaventa, 2006) . Given this accountability gap or 'democratic deficit' (Rhodes, 2000: 84) (Thompson, 2003: 54) . This opportunity was even more relevant to Northern Ireland where citizen engagement within the political/ democratic process has traditionally been constrained (Wilford and Wilson, 2001; McAlister, 2010) . The erosion of local political accountability through 'Direct Rule' is said to have created a 'democratic void' (McAlister, 2010: 544) or 'democratic deficit' (Wilford and Wilson, 2001: 3; Wilford et al., 2003) . While it may be false to assume that 'opportunities for participation were relatively non-existent during the period of direct rule' (McAlister, 2010: 539) (Colhoun, 2007) . However, implementation of RPA was a 'tortuous' process dogged by sectarian politics (Knox, 2012: 119) . For example, an originally proposed seven council model was widely criticised for its potential to contribute to the 'balkanisation' of Northern Ireland through a regional East/West sectarian split (Birrell, 2008; Knox, 2008) . Meanwhile, the recommendation by the Independent Boundaries Commissioner to incorporate some districts into Belfast City Council sparked disagreement and ensuing deadlock between Northern Ireland's two largest political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (Knox, 2012) . The nationalist Sinn Fein accused the DUP of attempting to gerrymander boundaries as proposed by the independent commissioner, out of fear of nationalist control of Belfast City Council (O'Hara, 2010).
Eleven new super councils eventually became operational in April 2015 with local government (i.e. the super councils) assuming responsibility for the majority of key planning functions (which were previously administered centrally through Planning NI -formerly the Planning Service). Through 'community planning' councils are required to genuinely engage communities and individuals to create a vision for their area and make more locally responsive decisions (Cave, 2012) .
Citizen engagement can depend on the compliance of actors with the 'rules of engagement'
as set out by the public sector (Clegg, 1989; McAreavey, 2008; Taylor, 2003) . Public consultation can provide a mechanism for taking the 'pulse of public opinion' or become a voice gathering exercise to 'secure legitimacy for policies' (tokenism) (Cornwall, 2004: 2) .
According to Shand and Arnberg (1996) , public consultation is initiated from 'the assumption that governments will decide' (Bishop and Davis, 2002: 22) . This resonates with the thoughts of Arnstein (1969: 216 and 219): 'it [consultation] offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken into account'. While certain stakeholders are likely to be more powerful on particular issues, government often holds the 'real' power to determine the weight given to particular issues during policy making.
Consultation should therefore be 'predicated on an acceptance by policy makers that those being consulted have the capacity not only to comment, but to influence the final disposition of the policy' (Bishop and Davis, 2002: 22) . In Northern Ireland, Murray (2010: 3) claims:
'citizen input is openly encouraged, [and] facilitated…but arguably behind the scenes the levers of cautious control are at work in steering policy agendas towards particular views of the public interest'.
Elsewhere too, the degree to which public consultation outcomes fed through to inform policy decisions has also been questioned. For example, the relationship between the consultation outcome and the design of the Cairngorms National Park (CNP) has been widely critiqued (Illsley and Richardson, 2004; Ferguson and Forster, 2005; Thompson, 2006; Rettie, 2010) . Key features of the Cairngorms National Park (CNP) were deemed to have been based less on the results of consultation and more on political bargaining between Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), Local Authorities, District councillors and Scottish
Ministers. Rettie (2001) concluded that ultimate power rested with the 'political arm of society' in deciding critical aspects of the CNP (Rettie, 2010: 134-137) , sharing the views of Illsley and Richardson (2004: 237) : 'the consultation was merely an attempt to persuade participants of the legitimacy of a position predetermined by political considerations'.
Given that the consultation process was conducted through a partnership structure (the Mourne National Park Working Party), it is necessary to review literature relating to the democratic credentials of partnerships. Partnership working has become a fundamental component of UK national park management (UKANPA, 2010) . Even in the USA, the country that first introduced wilderness, state owned parks, 'partnership parks' have adopted public-private partnerships to guide management (Hamin, 2001: 124) . However, a critical literature has emerged in a variety of contexts concerning the apparent 'fragile democratic legitimacy of partnerships' (Sable, 1996: 96) . Notwithstanding the partnership approach adopted by the Cairngorms National Park Authority (CNPA), Stockdale and Barker (2009) detected low levels of community inclusion in the early years of national park designation.
Moreover, government invitation to all stakeholders to participate will not necessarily lead to equal participation as the legitimacy of partnerships can be undermined by issues of power, representation, lack of accountability and resource differentials (Taylor, 2003; . First, the initiator of the partnership is afforded disproportionate influence in choosing who is invited to participate; accordingly, 'an exercise of power is evident in the very construction of the partnership' (Shortall, 2004: 117) .
Second, partnerships can suffer from an accountability gap as responsibility and power is transferred away from elected political structures to unelected partnership members (Skelcher, 2000) . While partnership board places are sometimes reserved for locally elected representatives, this practice varies considerably (Skelcher, 2000) . Furthermore, the partnerships can contribute to the growing power base of particular actors (Shortall, 2004; Woods, 2005a) as individuals frequently occupy positions on several partnership boards ('usual suspects'). Additional issues emerge concerning whom representatives speak for and what interests they represent within the community (Derkzen and Bock, 2009 ).
Third, resource differentials can determine the relative influence of partners (Taylor, 2007) .
While the control of resources and land traditionally afforded status, wealth and power to the landowning elite (Woods, 1997) , the new system of rural governance has been said to give disproportionate influence to funders and partnership managers (Woods, 2005b) . According to Woods (2005b: 170) , all modes of governing privilege certain voices over others and 'concentrate power in line with the distribution of valued resources'. Given the potential for tension and power struggles between partnership members with disparate interests and agendas it is necessary to appreciate the influence of power within the partnership setting (Shortall, 2004; Derkzen et al., 2008; Derkzen and Bock, 2009) . Equally, the influence of power is likely to be evident within the consultation arena.
In order to understand the diverse manifestations of power, Lukes' (1974; three stage model of power, which builds on previous power studies, is adopted in this paper as a framework for guiding power analysis. The first dimension, based on the work of Dahl (1957), focused on overt power examining observable behaviour and decision making. The second dimension, centering on the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) , concentrated on covert power and the suppression of difficult issues through controlling the agenda. Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 6) claim that power can be exercised by 'confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues' (cited in Lukes, 1974: 18) . Therefore as Barnes (1988) ideology to define what constitutes legitimate development. As a result, the powerless (often those on lower incomes) were said to support the sustainability concept while being unaware that they are being disadvantaged by it (through limiting the availability of affordable housing).
Lukes (2005) revisited and developed his view of third dimensional power, taking account of criticisms leveled at his thesis, particularly concerning the structural aspects of power (Isaac, 1987; Hayward, 1998) . Lukes clarified his thoughts on the influence of structure: 'social life can only be properly understood as an interplay of power and structure to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits ' (2005: 69 'power is about individuals and groups having the means and the ability to achieve goals that further their interests, all in the context of this larger social system'.
Lukes ' (2005) updated work recognises that individual action can be constrained or enabled by wider structuring forces (Isaac, 1987; Hayward, 1998) , such as socio-political context, social hierarchy or participatory formats, which provides an ideal framework for examining power within governance structures and specifically the role of power in influencing the outcome of the Mourne national park policy process.
Local Context and Methodology
The empirical findings presented in this paper are drawn from qualitative data collected from However, the entire area has a highly fractured land ownership pattern consisting of over 1500 private farm holdings (53% of land in the Mournes is actively farmed) with an average farm size of 15 hectares (CAAN, 2007) . With the exception of government and National
Trust owned land and a number of short Rights of Way (approximately 18 kilometres, with some permissive pathways (Mitchell, 1999) ), public access to private land in the Mournes is de facto, granted by custom rather than legal right (CAAN, 2007) . Occupiers Liability is therefore a concern amongst some Mourne landowners and the way in which land has been held in families for several generations and in some instances acquired through paying off annuities (Bell and Stockdale, 2015c) , has engrained a sense of parochialism and local defensiveness of private land ownership rights, which many perceive national park designation will erode. comparison to other parts of the UK are poorly resourced and receive limited protection through the planning system. In this context, the MHT revived the idea of a national park in 1999, proposing a 'celtic national park' for the Mournes (Mitchell, 1999) . This paper examines the governance structures employed to progress national park policy in Northern Ireland, focussing primarily on the wider structural factors that framed the public consultation exercise in the Mourne AONB. Stakeholder feedback from those involved in the consultation exercise (such as organisers, participants or observers) provided the primary data source. Given the importance of 'preparatory reading' and 'exploratory work' prior to conducting interviews (May, 2001: 132) , a range of documentary material was gathered and analysed. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were employed and interview candidates were identified from the initial documentary analysis and through referral (snowball sampling). Several snowballs were initiated to ensure the interview profile did not comprise interviewees with one particular outlook or belief.
All interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed. Interview participants were offered confidentiality through a process of anonymity. The identity of individuals involved in the research process (for the most part) remains confidential (most interviewees are referred to by their stakeholder grouping). In certain circumstances, following consent from the individual, their identity has been revealed (in such instances interviewees have been referred to by name or organisation).
21 interviews were conducted in the Mournes (2011/12) and the interview sample included:
farmers and trustees (3), management body representatives (2), local residents (1), politicians (6), community representatives (1), government officials (2), business and tourism representatives (3), conservationists (2) and consultation facilitators (1).
Given the time lapse between the empirical research (2011/12) and the process (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) under investigation, it is acknowledged that memory recall was a potential weakness of the interview method. Indeed, post consultation experiences had the potential to distort stakeholder perspectives of the original consultation process. However, the opportunity to examine post-event stakeholder perspectives facilitated a longer-term assessment of the designation process. For example, the time lapse between the public consultation and the interviews allowed a number of interviewees to speak openly, freely and on 'reflection', which facilitated deeper understanding of the consultation. As Richards (1996: 200) sums up:
'the further from the events they [interviews] are [conducted] , the less reliable the information, (though the more willing they may be to talk)'.
Given that the research was concerned with structural and power aspects of the policy process, it was necessary to interview elites, such as those who had an influential role in setting the agenda and defining the parameters of the process (for example, politicians and government officials). As Richards (1996: 199) explains:
'the whole notion of an elite, implies a group of individuals, who hold, or have held a privileged position in society and...are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public'.
Elite interviews can potentially 'shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from analysis of political outcomes, or of other primary sources' (Tansey, 2009: 7) .
Conversely, the reliability of elite interview material can be undermined by interviewees who seek to slant their account of particular events (Tansey, 2009) . While elite actors provided critical sources of information on the events and processes under investigation, the array of research contacts included in the interview schedule represented a key strength of the research, as the empirical analysis was informed by a breadth of first-hand stakeholder insights.
The data was analysed thematically, following the phases set out by Braun and Clarke (2006) .
'Active' re-reading of transcripts informed the creation of codes. Data analysis software package (NVivo9) assisted the reconstruction of the data set; some codes were merged and more focussed codes were defined. An original 65 codes were organised into preliminary themes and following a period of reflection a series of overarching themes were confirmed.
Three themes relating to structural aspects of the policy process are analysed in this paper:
initiating national park policy; governance structures and agenda setting; and the consultation process and government response. In each, the power dynamics between different stakeholders are examined using Lukes' framework.
Initiating National Parks Policy
While the prospect of national park designation in Northern Ireland was quashed by financial constraints and other political priorities prior to devolution (Bell and Stockdale, 2015a) Notably, an absence of information around possible national park structures (eg. aims, management arrangements and planning functions) led to perceived, and at times irrational, fears which were allowed to fester and snowball perpetuating a 'fear of the unknown' (Bell and Stockdale, 2009: 317 On one occasion the Mourne Observer (local newspaper) dedicated a three page spread almost entirely to the anti-national park cause. Figure 1 reproduces the headlines it contained, and notably only makes reference to possible economic benefits from designation. This has resonance with the third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005) ; the perpetuation of mistruths about the impacts of a possible land use designation could be interpreted as an attempt by powerful individuals (landowners and farmers) at the local level to manipulate the views of other actors. The powerless fail to recognise the potential benefits and therefore choose to oppose designation in line with the interests of the powerful, even though these may be contradictory to their own real interests. For example, national park designation may be in the real interests of some local stakeholders through new financial opportunities.
Alternatively, national park induced house price inflation may limit the ability of young people to live in the area. Not surprisingly, no interviewee admitted to intentionally disseminating mistruths or misinformation; however, regardless of whether fears were real, imagined or simply voiced to bolster an anti-national park campaign, the lack of information on national park structures and possible impacts/benefits meant people were unable to make an informed choice as to how national park might affect their real interests. This atmosphere of uncertainty was an ideal breeding ground for national park opponents to gain power and influence the values and thoughts of an uninformed public.
Governance Structures and Setting of the Agenda
The The way in which government framed the public consultation was viewed by some as a government attempt to limit the debate to safe issues (power in the second dimension). The excerpt from interview below is typical of several such comments on this and highlights that topics such as, is there a need for a national park and what is the level of support for it, were not placed on the consultation agenda:
"…They never asked for a show of hands to see how many were opposed to national park…that question was never asked…they were afraid of a resounding no" (National park opponent).
A former DoE official explained that a 'yes' or 'no' discussion (about the designation of a national park) was not incorporated in the MNPWP agenda because the decision to designate 
.we felt we couldn't go out there and do a piece of work which tested whether or not local people want it…" (MNPWP member).
Indeed the process of assembling the MNPWP proved controversial from the outset.
Initially, the largest landowner in the Mournes (Mourne Trustees) was not invited onto the membership of the MNPWP:
"[the Mourne Trustees] Are the big stakeholder in this whole process; the people who were going to be most affected by a national park were not involved in the process initially…[the Mourne Trustees] should have been the people first consulted…it was only when the committee got up and running that one person within the committee pushed for [the Trustees] to be represented on it" (Mourne farmer).
Meanwhile, the inclusion of two National Trust representatives on the MNPWP provoked suspicion amongst landowners and raised doubts relating to government's ulterior motives.
Some perceived the National Trust's membership to be a signal of government's true desire to nationalise the Mournes through national park designation. In the absence of legislation detailing the type/form of national park to be introduced, unfounded speculation grew: A MNPWP member also claimed: "The committee [MNPWP] , it was said by everyone everywhere, was completely unrepresentative". In common with evidence accrued from other critiques of rural partnerships (Shortall, 2004; Derkzen and Bock, 2009) , the construction of the MNPWP became an exercise of power as government chose which interests to include. These findings resonate with the thoughts of Cornwall (2004) . She cites the work of Alonso and Costa in a Brazilian context where government created spaces, comprising local elites, 'served to disarm any potential local opposition and effectively empty the invited space of its political significance' (Cornwall, 2004: 5) . Instead of minimising dissent and disarming opposition, this perceived government manipulation of the consultation process had the reverse effect, fuelling a vociferous opposition campaign. As outlined in the formal consultation report, comments regarding the integrity of the MNPWP were explicitly raised during public meetings (Inform Communications, 2008: 183-184) . A locally elected councillor claimed:
"I do not believe that [the chairman] and [anonymous] are independent members of the Working Party [MNPWP]" (Local councillor).
A Mourne resident also expressed concerns over whether or not the MNPWP report would provide an accurate account of the consultation process and public opinion:
"I have concerns over [the chairman] submitting the consultation report and feel that a consultative body should produce it" (Mourne resident).
These statements demonstrate the sense of distrust within elements of the local community.
Some individuals did not trust certain MNPWP members to put aside their vested or personal interests to act and make decisions for the greater good. Accordingly, in the minds of some, the legitimacy and democratic integrity of the consultation process was tainted by the makeup of the MNPWP and by prior rivalries between local stakeholders. The Mourne resident above seems to suggest that an outside body using independent facilitators may have been Party" which was highlighted by the resignation of two members in the final stages of the process (see below).
The polarised position of MNPWP members suggests that, contrary to the claims of some, the MNPWP was not solely comprised of national park sympathisers. However, the potential for partnerships to privilege certain voices and give disproportionate influence and power to partnership managers (Woods, 2005b) Regardless of government's intentions, power was exercised in the second dimension (Lukes, 2005) . The power of the initiator (Shortall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006) , in this case government, in determining the make-up of the MNPWP was interpreted by some as a deliberate attempt to populate the MNPWP with stakeholders who were sympathetic to a government agenda. In reality it was impossible to determine the validity of such claims. The opposing views of MNPWP members suggested that members held differing views and a former DoE official suggested the exclusion of the Mourne Trustees may have been an honest oversight by government. Whether their initial exclusion was attributable to an illegitimate exercise of government power or insufficient (or lack of) stakeholder mapping, it was a major flaw to exclude the Trustees from the outset. As a result, the eventual Trustee inclusion in the MNPWP was shrouded in suspicion and fear concerning their future control of the area. In accordance with the thoughts of Healey (2006) , the findings suggest that traditional ways of working operated below the camouflage of collaboration which influenced who got listened to and who shaped the policy.
The Consultation Process and Government's Response
The design or format of the MNPWP consultation was set by government and the independent consultation facilitators, and in effect restricted the public consultation process to public meetings. This went against a more varied format preferred by the MNPWP itself:
"We [the MNPWP] decided to hold workshops and surgeries but the Department
[government] brought in one of these PR companies and they said hold public meetings. We told them we don't agree with this but the Department said no, these experts say hold a big public meeting" (MNPWP member).
Just as Taylor (2000 Taylor ( : 2023 noted 'the pressures to conform to a pre-determined official template' in urban partnerships, the independent facilitator of the Mournes consultation felt that the format options for the consultation process were curtailed solely by government (not government and the facilitator as suggested by the MNPWP member above): This is perhaps reflective of the accepted format for conducting consultations in Northern
Ireland: "It tends to be done very traditionally, I don't think there is much more consultation than the basics" (DoE official). The apparent terms set out by government, by which the consultation was bound, were further reflected upon by a MNPWP member: "Oh they [government] were all powerful because they produced all the funding for it". According to some, the attempt by government to hand over responsibility for designing the consultation to a partnership of local representatives was constrained by the institutional norms and practices of government at the time which resulted in a narrow range of consultation methods being employed. A resulting over-reliance on traditional consultation mechanisms (such as public meetings) limited effective engagement, gave a platform to vested interests, fuelled conflict and intimidation (Bell and Stockdale, 2015c ) and ultimately undermined the government's ability to take forward a controversial policy agenda in the Mournes. The findings raise doubts over how committed government were to assessing broad public opinion and whether there was a genuine attempt to incorporate community desires in the formulation of national parks policy.
The potential for conflict between opposing interests with individual agendas was apparent through an inability by MNPWP members to agree a final consultation report. The nominees of the Mourne Trustees (MNPWP members) felt their interpretation of the local views vented during the consultation process differed 'so significantly' to those being put forward in the consultation report, that they should submit their own minority report (Mourne Trustees, 2010) . The Trustees claimed that the MNPWP report gave undue weight to the views of vested interest groups and MNPWP members and failed to give adequate expression to public views. The Trustees were particularly incensed that the MNPWP report underplayed the strength of the opposition to a national park and any new management arrangements. As the consultation report neared completion, the Trustees' request to submit a minority report was refused by the chairman of the MNPWP. Accordingly, the articulation of local interests was constrained by micro-level power differentials. Deeming their position untenable, the Trustees' nominees resigned from the MNPWP, choosing to submit an independent report to 'better reflect' the views heard (Mourne Trustees, 2010: 3-4) .
Whether the interests of the Mourne Trustees were actually marginalised more than any other stakeholder grouping is difficult to judge. It was apparent from the Trustee's report that they Communications, 2008: 78) .
This statement typifies the hesitancy amongst some local politicians and the reluctance to appear publicly supportive. Conversely, should politicians be prepared to set aside concerns about losing local votes to take regionally important decisions? Margaret Ritchie, MP for the area, revealed that she was not prepared to provide strategic leadership for a Mourne national park: "I will be very much guided by the outcome of that consultation but more importantly I will be guided by the are often major change agents in socio-political processes of significance to many people beyond their locality and even beyond their state'. In the case of the Mournes, particular individuals within the community became major 'anti-change agents' resulting in an outcome which has significance to many people within and beyond the Mournes locality.
Out of recognition of the complex access issues which were illuminated during the Mourne consultation, the Environment Minister allocated £500,000 to improve access arrangements in the Mournes (DoE, 2007 'property rights have become so entrenched and symbolic of personal freedom in many societies that efforts to re-organise or effect these, and the value that attaches to them, are typically met with fierce opposition'.
Current Northern Ireland public access and land ownership arrangements afford private landowners considerable influence and power in determining the future success of a Mourne national park. Therefore, the importance of gaining the support of private landowners may go some way towards explaining why the national park debate in Northern Ireland has been predominantly concentrated at the local level.
Conclusion
There has been much debate concerning the extent to which collaborative processes can achieve consensus, generate trust, neutralise conflict and equalise power differentials amongst actors with deeply opposing beliefs (Warner, 1997; Sidaway, 1998; Margerum, 2002; Healey, 2003; Innes, 2004) . However, there is little evidence that any of the above factors materialised through the Northern Ireland national park consultation process as tensions were fuelled and diverging participant views became further entrenched.
If (as in Scotland) the first step had been to consult widely across Northern Ireland (through a national consultation exercise) to inform the drafting of primary legislation, a site specific designation (for example, in the Mournes) could have been pursued with a clearer understanding of possible national park structures and powers (aims, management structures, planning functions). As a result of this structural flaw, MNPWP members reported feeling helpless at their inability to answer questions during public meetings and local stakeholders revealed their frustration at the lack of information and answers to questions. This legislative context shaped the discourse taking place (or not taking place) in the public meeting arena which had direct implications for the inclusiveness of the consultation process. A resulting fear of the unknown and perceived national park restrictions saw an anti-national park campaign escalate and result in reduced involvement from the local community. The powerful role of the media in shaping public views in the Mournes was also apparent.
Through circulating information and reporting the views of certain local interests, the local media contributed to reproducing and maintaining local uncertainty and doubt and accordingly reinforced the power of local elites (namely landowners).
Aided by Lukes' (1974; framework, which facilitated a broad appreciation of the diverse and subtle ways in which power can effect participatory governance, this paper has demonstrated how power can manifest at different stages of the policy making process. Local authorities are often deemed to be disproportionately focussed on facilitating economic development at the expense of the environment (Illsley and Richardson, 2004) . If Northern
Ireland's internationally significant landscapes continue to suffer from a lack of strategic planning, management and protection, this vital resource upon which the future prosperity and well-being of society (both local and regional) depends, could be undermined by the pursuit of short-term economic development goals (Bell and Stockdale, 2015b 
